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Abstract — Internet has become indispensable to the modern 
society nowadays. Due to the dynamic nature of human 
activities, the evolving mobile technology has played a 
significant role and it is reflected in the exponential growth of 
the number of mobile users globally. However, the 
characteristic of the Internet as an open network made it 
vulnerable to various malicious activities. To secure 
communication at network layer, IETF recommended IPsec as 
a security feature. Mobile IPv6 as the successor of the current 
mobile technology, Mobile IPv4, also mandated the use of IPsec. 
However, since IPsec is a set of security algorithm, it has several 
well-known weaknesses such as bootstrapping issue when 
generating a security association as well as complex key 
exchange mechanism. It is a well-known fact that IPsec has a 
high overhead especially when implemented on Mobile IPv6 and 
used on limited energy devices such as mobile devices. This 
paper aims to enhance the IPsec performance by substituting 
the existing key exchange algorithm with a lightweight elliptic 
curve algorithm. The experiments managed to reduce the delay 
of IPsec in Mobile IPv6 by 67% less than the standard 
implementation. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Based on the Internet world statistic published in [1], 
56.1% of the world population is connected to the Internet in 
2019. Since the year 2000, Internet users have gone up by 
1,104%. In March 2019, there are 4,346,561,853 people 
communicating through the Internet. They may communicate 
with other people, either using fixed devices as well as mobile 
devices. The number of mobile broadband subscription has 
reached about 4.3 billion subscriptions globally [2]. This 
mean almost all Internet users use mobile technology to 
connect to the Internet. One of the reasons for the exponential 
growth of mobile users is because the cost of mobile 
broadband has become more affordable than fixed 
broadband. Mobile infrastructure usually utilizes wireless 
technology to enable quick connection for mobile devices. 
Being an open network, the internet is also vulnerable to 
malicious activities. In the case of wireless communication, 
especially Mobile IPv6, the vulnerability is greater. It is 
because the message exchange between devices is conducted 
via broadcasting. The 2016 Norton cybercrime [3] reported 
that 87% of consumers have in-home Wi-Fi, and they engage 
in dangerous behaviors. However, 66% of their home 
connections are not protected. Hence, the condition leaves 
them vulnerable to hackers eavesdropping on the network and 
intercepting their information. Within the last year, 689 
million people in 21 countries were impacted by cybercrime. 
Furthermore, about $126 billion were spent globally in 
dealing with cybercrime. It has conclusively been shown that 
an increasing number of wireless devices could increase the 
illicit cybercriminal activities that may include, but not 
limited to, computer hacking, malicious attacks, data forging 
and financial information theft. 
All standard on Mobile IPv6 mandated the use of IPsec to 
secure the mobility support on IPv6 such as RFC 3775 and 
RFC 6275.  The RFC 6275, the latest standard of mobility 
support in IPv6, has mandated the use of IPsec on 
establishing security association (SA) to assure the integrity 
and authenticity of mobility messages as the essential 
information [4].  The standard specifies the usage of IPsec by 
mandating the use of Encapsulating Security Payload [5] 
header in transport mode. The ESP could authenticate the 
data origin, provide the connectionless integrity as well as 
replay attack protection.  
IPsec is a set of security protocol that is mandatory on the 
implementation of IPv6 as well as Mobile IPv6.  The IPsec 
was standardized in RFC 4301 [6] that combines three main 
security protocols which are Authentication Header (AH) [7], 
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [5] and Internet Key 
Exchange (IKE) [8, 9].  The primary function of AH is to 
assure the connectionless integrity as well as to authenticate 
the source of transmitted data.  Also, it can be used to provide 
an optional service such as replay attack protection. This 
protocol could be implemented by itself, or in combination 
with ESP.  The ESP itself is used to provide all functions of 
the AH plus the confidentiality of the data transmitted 
through the network.  
Based on RFC 7296 [9], the IKE is a key exchange 
mechanism that performs mutual authentication between 
communication parties. It is also used to establish SA which 
is a set of key and policy used to secure information. In order 
to make the SA establishment on both ESP and AH more 
efficient, a shared secret information could be included. Fig. 
1 shows a block diagram of information exchange between 
initiator and responder to initiate establishment of a SA on 
IKEv2. There are two pairs of messages for initiating 
communication (IKE_SA_INIT Request and IKE_SA_INIT 
Response) and authenticating identities as well as certificates 
(IKE_AUTH Request and IKE_AUTH Request). All 
messages are cryptographically protected including the keys 
negotiated in the first pair of initiation message.  
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Fig. 1 Messages Exchange for Establishing SA in IKEv2 
The first pair contains IKE header (HDR), SA, key 
exchange (KE) and nonce. The KE payload includes a Diffie 
Helman value. Once the responder receives the request 
message, it completes the Diffie Helman key exchange by 
sending its KE and nonce. Using the second message pair, 
both the responder and initiator can independently generate 
keying information that supports the IKE SA. The messages 
include a certificate containing the public key used.       
A number of researchers had evaluated the use of IPsec to 
secure Mobile IPv6 such as [10], [11], and [12]. Jara et al. 
[10] analyzed the suitability of Mobile IPv6 and IPsec for 
resource-constrained devices. They designed, developed, and 
evaluated a lightweight mechanism for the integration of 
Mobile IPv6 with IPsec as its security feature. Their proposal 
considered the use of IPsec for resource-constrained device 
such as IoT by adding header compression as well as reduced 
the footprint requirements. The authors implemented a 
Lightweight Mobile IPv6 over Contiki OS. Their evaluation 
highlighted a successful offering of mobility with a handover 
in under two seconds. However, they also stated that IPsec 
introduced high latency due to the additional time required to 
encrypt and to send the over headed packet.  
The authors of [11] surveyed the usage of IPsec in Mobile 
IP, especially on Mobile IPv6. It provides a study of security 
issues in Mobile IPv6 and the role of IPsec on securing 
mobile communication. As it is known, IPsec provides 
security to the transport layer and network layer. The study 
found that the security suite has 80% impact on mobile IP 
communication. This is because of the use of AH and ESP as 
the primary security protocols on IPsec which add a heavy 
computation task on the operation of IPsec. Both requires 
using internet key exchange algorithm to establish a SA. 
However, it is still susceptible to threats and attacks. On 
transport mode, even though IPsec secures host to host 
communication, it lacks encryption to the IPv6 header. The 
tunnel mode on the other hand, although does encrypts the 
IPv6 header as well and assigns a new header, it is not able to 
deliver end to end secure connection. 
Performance analysis of the usage of IPsec on Mobile 
IPv6 was also done by Faigl et al. [12]. This paper focused 
on the use of IPsec on protecting Mobile IPv6 signaling. The 
signaling is done between Mobile Node and its Home Agent 
by transmitting Binding Update Message as well as Binding 
Acknowledgment message. The author described the 
overheads that were caused by the mechanism of signaling 
protection. They analyzed the overheads based on the 
queuing theory. The total response time for the mobility 
process in the network resulted in a high value of up to 18.5 
ms.  
Based on the previous studies, we can conclude that the 
use of IPsec to secure Mobile IPv6 introduces some overhead 
as well as long delay. One of the contributors to the overhead 
is the IKE algorithm that manages the security association 
establishment.  The existing IPsec mandates the use of IKEv2 
on the implementation of IPsec as standardized in RFC 7296 
[9]. The standard defined Diffie Helman algorithm with 768-
bit and 1024-bit MODP to get a shared secret key. However, 
the newer standard, RFC 8268 [13] stated that the usage of 
MODP group less than 2048-bit is no longer suggested.  
This paper aims to enhance the performance of IPsec by 
replacing the existing key exchange algorithm with a better 
algorithm. We propose an algorithm based on elliptic curve 
algorithm [14], ECP 384-bit as the new replacement. The rest 
of this paper is an overview of the internet key exchange and 
Mobile IPv6 operation in Section 2, and methodology in 
Section 3. Section 4 provides result and discussion. The last 
part of this paper is the conclusion that will be provided in 
Section 5.  
II. OVERVIEW OF INTERNET KEY EXCHANGE AND MIPV6
A. Internet Key Exchange on IPsec 
IPsec is a security suite that integrates several security 
protocols as well as provides both confidentiality and 
integrity services. In order to ensure confidentiality, it usually 
uses an encryption mechanism. Based on the standard (RFC 
7296), IPsec uses symmetry cryptography that requires a key 
exchange algorithm. The internet key exchange (IKE) is 
needed to define the key generation as well as to establish a 
secure environment for the key distribution process. The IKE 
consists of three protocols:  Internet Security Association and 
Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP), a protocol that is 
required in establishing a SA; OAKLEY protocol to describe 
a series of key exchange and services provided; and SKEME, 
a key exchange method that provides repudiability and fast 
key refreshment.  
There are two phases in the implementation of IKE in 
IPsec according to its functionality [15]: 
1. Phase 1: establishing a security association
In this phase, the two parties involved in the
communication build a SA using the ISAKMP protocol. 
They create a virtual network that can share parameters
after the SA has been established. The SA control data
traffic in one direction, and hence, it needs to establish
another SA to control data traffic in the opposite
direction. Thus, there is a need to create a SA pair to
each IPsec. It then stores the SA established in a security 
association database.
2. Phase 2: negotiation on providing security services
Phase 2 involved negotiation on IPsec services such as
key material as well as parameters needed. It is done
Initiator 
(i) 
Responder 
(r) 
HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni 
HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr, 
HDR, SK {IDi, [CERT,] 
[CERTREQ,] [IDr,] AUTH, 
SAi2, TSi, TSr} 
HDR, SK {IDr, [CERT,] 
AUTH, SAr2, TSi, TSr} 
IKE_SA_INIT Request 
IKE_AUTH Request 
IKE_SA_INIT Response 
IKE_AUTH Response 
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using a Quick Mode that is initiated after phase 1 is 
completed. Finally, the IKE defines some features in the 
SA that includes the encryption algorithm, hash 
algorithm, authentication method, and the group for the 
Diffie Hellman (DH) exchange. 
Based on RFC 7296, the current IPsec mandated IPv6, 
including the Mobile IPv6 to use IKEv2. The IKEv2 consists 
of three phases that can be described as follows: 
1. Phase 1 
In IKEv2, phase 1 begins with the initiation of IKE SA 
that consists of only two packets containing all the 
information of the four packets in IKEv1. All the packets 
transmitted are encrypted and authenticated by the IKE. 
2. Phase 1.5 
This phase manages the IKE authentication that consists 
of: 
• The authentication payloads and ISAKMP identifier 
• The authentication method (RSA, PSK, ECDSA, or 
EAP) 
• The IPsec SA parameters 
3. Phase 2     
The IKEv2 does not use Quick Mode on the negotiation 
between peers as in IKEv1. Once the SA has been 
established, phase 2 is done to negotiate the child SAs to 
generate a new key of the SA. 
As shown in Fig. 1, the process of IKEv2 always consists 
of a request-response pair. The requester is responsible for 
ensuring the reliability and thus it sets a timeout interval. If a 
response is not received within the preset interval, it should 
retransmit the request. To deliver its function, the IKEv2 uses 
several cryptographic algorithms, including four transforms 
types: encryption algorithm, pseudorandom functions, 
integrity algorithm, and Diffie-Helman Groups. 
B. Mobile IPv6 
IPv6 (Internet Protocol Version 6) was developed by 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) in the 90s by 
introducing RFC 2460 [16] that was obsoleted by RFC 8200 
[17]. It includes some advantages such as offering a large IP 
addresses pool as well as mobility support [4]. The mobility 
support on IPv6 was then called Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6) that 
were introduced to address some weaknesses of the current 
Mobile IP technology (MIP) [18, 19]. 
One of the problems on MIP is the triangle routing 
mechanism that requires a long time to complete. The triangle 
includes mobile node (MN), home agent (HA) and 
correspondence node (CN). The actual communication is 
between the MN and CN. However, in the triangle 
mechanism, all message exchange between MN and CN 
should be routed through the HA [20]. In order to address this 
problem, MIPv6 introduced a route optimization mechanism 
that makes a direct communication between MN and CN 
without disturbing the HA as shown in Fig. 2.  
 Fig. 2 shows the communication between MN and CN 
without the assistance of the HA. Once MN connects to a new 
network, it will generate a care of address (CoA) that binds 
with its original address, home address (HoA). However, it 
should register the new CoA to its HA and CN by sending a 
Binding Update (BU) message. When the CN receives the 
BU message, it will check its binding cache to know the 
availability of the received CoA. If the new CoA is not in the 
entry, it will create an entry accordingly and then reply with 
a Binding Acknowledgement (BA) message.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.2 Route Optimization in MIPv6 
The role of BU and BA message in Fig. 2 are very 
significant since the binding address will be used for 
communication. False address information will result in   
miscommunication. In addition, some general attacks could 
also manipulate these messages to perform malicious activity 
such as DoS attacks, Man-in-the-middle attacks, and replay 
attacks [21].  Thus, a security mechanism is required to 
protect these messages. As mandated in RFC 7296, the 
security of binding information should use IPsec. Hence, the 
performance of IPsec including key exchange algorithm must 
be at least favorable.  
The challenge of securing BU and BA messages have 
attracted a number of researchers to propose various security 
improvements such as [22] and [23]. However, this paper 
focuses on the improvement of IPsec since it is the mandatory 
security support for MIPv6. The improvement is on the 
performance of the key exchange algorithm without adding a 
significant overhead or degrading the network performance.   
III. METHODOLOGY 
An experimental isolated IPv6 network testbed was set up 
and IPsec based on IKEv2 protocol was implemented using 
strongSwan software. Fig. 3 shows the network topology of 
the testbed including the certificate of each host. The 
certificate is X509 that uses elliptic curve digital signature 
algorithm (ECDSA) 256 bits as the public key. Once the 
establishment of IPsec system has been completed, further 
tests are conducted on the usage of the key exchange 
cryptography algorithm used in IKEv2 especially on the 
Diffie Helman Group on the key exchange process. The first 
test uses the existing algorithm (MODP 1024-bit), and the 
second test uses two candidates which are MODP 3072-bit 
and ECP 384-bit. The experiments measure several 
parameters including the time required to establish the SA 
and the entire delay time of IPsec implementation. This is 
done to find the most suitable algorithm to be implemented 
on Mobile IPv6.  
Home Agent 
Correspondence Node 
Internet 
Mobile Node 
BU 
BA 
Direct 
Communication 
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Fig. 3. Network Topology of Testbed and Host’s Certificate 
Similar with the previous experiment conducted in [24], 
several scenarios were conducted to select one of the two 
candidates of key exchange cryptographic algorithms 
running on an IPsec system to replace the current one. 
Furthermore, three algorithms, as follows, were tested:   
1. MODP 1024-bit, the currently used algorithm   
2. MODP 3072-bit, an algorithm with longer key length as 
recommended by RFC 8268 
3. ECP 384-bit, a lightweight elliptic curve algorithm 
IV. RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
An analysis on the Diffie Helman algorithm is done prior 
to the experiments. The important step on the Diffie Helman 
algorithm is the selection of a prime n umber. For the two 
candidates, their primes are shown in Equation 1 for 3072-bit 
MODP group and Equation 2 for 384-bit ECP group, 
respectively. Based on the prime calculation equation, the 
MODP group is more complex than the ECP group.  
ܲ ൌ 	2ଷ଴଻ଶ െ 2ଷ଴଴଼ െ 1 ൅	2଺ସ	ሼሾ2ଶଽସଶగሿ ൅ 1690314ሽ     (1) 
݌ ൌ 	2ଷ଼ସ െ 2ଵଶ଼ ൅ 2ଽ଺ ൅ 2ଷଶ െ 1                      (2) 
 The ECP group uses integer arithmetic modulo as in 
Equation 2, which is more efficient compared to binary field 
arithmetic used in MODP group. The number 384 means the 
ECP uses elliptic curve, as shown in Equation 3 with field size 
of 384. The values of Group Prime, Group Curve and Group 
Order for this field are from RFC 5903 [25]: 
Group Prime: 
FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF 
FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFE 
FFFFFFFF 00000000 00000000 FFFFFFFF 
 
Group Curve: 
B3312FA7 E23EE7E4 988E056B E3F82D19 
181D9C6E FE814112 0314088F 5013875A  
C656398D 8A2ED19D 2A85C8ED D3EC2AEF 
 
Group Order: 
FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF 
FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C7634D81 F4372DDF  
581A0DB2 48B0A77A ECEC196A CCC52973 
 ݕଶ ൌ 	ݔଷ െ 3ݔ ൅ ܾ                                                    (3) 
Experiments were done by implementing IPsec, including 
IKEv2 with three algorithms listed in Section 3. This section 
shows the results of the experiments. To compare the 
performance of the three algorithms, two-time parameters 
were recorded, including time required to establish SA and the 
IPsec delay. Since one of the well-known weaknesses of IPsec 
is the long delay due to the complex cryptographic algorithm, 
a lightweight algorithm is expected to improve this aspect. 
Fig. 4 shows the IPsec status of one of the hosts involved in 
the communication.  
 
Fig. 4. IPsec Status on the Host 
Fig. 4 shows the IPsec status of host that is connected to 
the IPv6 network. From the IPsec status, several information 
related to the connection can be seen, such as the 
authentication that is used by the host with a public key that 
indicates the use of digital signatures; there is also 
IKE_SA_INIT information of Internet Key Exchange (IKE) 
proposal containing AES_CBC_256/HMAC_SHA1_96 as 
the encryption algorithm and MODP-1024 as Diffie-
Hellman's key exchange algorithm for the first scenario. The 
second and third scenarios use MODP-3072 and ECP-384, 
respectively, as the key exchange algorithm. Fig. 5 
demonstrates the time required by each algorithm on 
generating itself. 
 
Fig. 5. The time required to generate the key exchange algorithm 
The experiments on generating key exchange algorithm 
were repeated 10 times. ECP-384 shows a constant time 
(0.007 s) for all experiments. It performed the fastest 
compared to other algorithms based on MODP group. A faster 
process on generating key exchange algorithm could reduce 
the potential threat for DoS attacks. Typically, DoS attacks are 
done by bombarding the target with many requests to 
overwhelm the processing task of the target. The more 
complex the process, the higher the chance of the attack to 
succeed, and vice versa. If the generation time is shorter, then 
modp1024 0.017 0.019 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017
modp3072 0.072 0.07 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.072
ecp384 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007
0
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0.04
0.05
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more time and resources will be needed by the attacker to 
succeed.   
Once the key exchange algorithm is generated, the IKEv2 
establishes an SA using the corresponding algorithm. Table 1 
shows the time required by each key exchange algorithm to 
create an SA. Theoretically, the time it takes for key 
generation correlates to the time for SA establishment; the 
faster the key generation, the faster the SA establishment. The 
experiments were repeated 10 times. The table includes the 
average time, minimum time, maximum, and deviation. The 
results show that on average, ECP-384 requires the least 
amaunt of time to complete. It requires 67% less time 
compared to MODP-1024. On the other hand, the completion 
time increased by 123% when using MODP-3072. 
TABLE 1. THE TIME REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH A SECURITY ASSOCIATION 
Time required MODP-1024 MODP-3072 ECP-384 
Average (s) 0.398 0.887 0.132 
Minimum (s) 0.311 0.763 0.092
Maximum (s) 0.488 1.026 0.187 
Deviation 0.057 0.063 0.036 
In term of deviation of the algorithms, ECP-384 also 
outperformed the other algorithms. The deviation of 0.036 for 
ECP-384 is the smallest of the three, which means it has the 
highest stability. From the result, it is clear that ECP-384 is 
the fastest on the SA establishment. Since the establishment is 
done inside IPsec, it should positively influence the overall 
delay of the IPsec implementation on Mobile IPv6. This is 
clearly presented in Fig. 6 which shows the IPsec delay using 
the three algorithms.  
Fig. 6. Delay on IPsec Implementation 
The experiments to measure the delay of IPsec 
implementation, including the key exchange as well as SA 
establishment were conducted and repeated 10 times. The 
results showed that ECP-384 has the lowest delay compared 
to the others. It is evident that the elliptic curve algorithm 
performed better than the existing algorithm used currently by 
IPsec. Based on the results, the ECP-384 is the most suitable 
candidate to be implemented in IPsec to secure Mobile IPv6. 
Any resource-constrained device using Mobile IPv6 could 
gain increased lifetime by reducing its energy consumption 
with faster IPsec configuration. However, it is worth noting 
that the key exchange is not the only overhead contributor in 
IPsec. There are also other cryptographic algorithms in IPsec 
implementation such as encryption algorithm to provide 
confidentiality and to hash MAC to ensure the integrity of 
messages. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 Most Internet standards mandated the use of IPsec to 
secure the Internet layer for both IPv6 and Mobile IPv6. IPsec 
as the security protocol involves some complex 
cryptographic computation, including the key exchange 
mechanism. The latest standardized algorithm on the key 
exchange is IKEv2 that is used to establish an SA. The IKEv2 
uses Diffie Helman Group algorithm to do the key exchange. 
Since IPsec has been well-known and well-documented to 
require heavy computation for use in Mobile IPv6, especially 
on resource constrained device, it needs a lightweight key 
exchange algorithm. The selection of key exchange 
cryptography is required. This paper proposes two candidates 
to replace the current algorithm, which are MODP-3072 and 
ECP-384.  
 Results of the experiments confirmed that ECP-384 is 
less complex and thus more lightweight than MODP-3072. 
The 384-bit cryptography of Elliptic Curve Group Modulo a 
Prime (ECP) can offer the best result in terms of key 
generation and cryptographic performance when applied to 
IPsec. Furthermore, if it is implemented on the Mobile IPv6 
environment, the enhancement of its security can be reached. 
In addition, it will enhance the network performance in 
general, compared to other cryptographic algorithms as 
suggested by NSS. 
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